By Stefan Sasse
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| contract was signed in the Hall of Mirrors at Versailles |
On 28 June 1919 signed the delegation of the German first republican government, led by Matthias Erzberger, the Treaty of Versailles, of the First World War with Germany officially beendete.Weitere Paris suburb contracts ended the war by 10 July also with German-Austria, Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire. To any country but was the peace treaty as charged and symbolically important as the German Empire, whose democratic government the taint of contract signing time of their existence around with him dragged like a millstone. But were the exact terms of the contract? As they looked out, and the effects were predictable? And, not unimportant: what could have been better, or at least done differently? . These questions will pursue the following article
The Treaty of Versailles was a compromise from the beginning of birth, in the three main parties fought each other, which had proved difficult to reconcile interests: the U.S., France and Great Britain. to understand your goals is the first step that allows today's contemporaries to understand the formation of the contract. It is also always important to keep in mind that a great power not at all participated in the negotiations: Russia. The country was at that time in full resolution and civil war, which was bitterly between reds and whites and led to interference by the Western powers (the Soviet Union should take them long term sick). The fate of the eastern giant was so still arbitrary, the victorious powers determined than Germany - a reason for the aggression with which the Soviet Union tried in the 1920s and 1930s to restore the pre-war borders and the newly emerging countries such as the Baltic States again .
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| The French Prime Minister Clemenceau |
most affected victors at the Versailles peace conference was France. The First World War was fought in the West wholly within its territory, and the French had bled terribly. The front line ran like a giant scar across the country destroyed, and the retreat of the Germans, who had first used the tactic of scorched earth, had left lasting bitterness. Hundreds of thousands dead, land almost on the edge. The French knew all too painfully, that they needed not only the help of Britain, but also of the USA had and that the war was still not lost by a hair. Won in any case it had not the French. The more important it seemed to them with a view to future security strategy that Germany - which after all had about 20 million more people than France - reduced to a strength was the maximum reached the level of France. The ultimate goal was a reversal of the unification of 1871. This goal, however, shared neither the Americans nor the British, as it soon became apparent, so that the French negotiating position developed so as to weaken Germany as strong and durable as possible and to isolate politically possible - a Reversion of German foreign policy after 1871.
The English position differed dramatically from the French already. The government in London was still the old thinking of the "Balance of Power" was coined, that is the balance among the major powers. This already jahrundertealten foreign policy doctrine, according to the British could no European state will be weakened too much, it should always be a balance. The serious weakness of Russia created by the Bolshevik revolution was a power vacuum in the East, the British Prime Minister Lloyd George thought, no more to add in Central Europe. The second part of the British balance-of-power doctrine However, both the absolute dominion of Great Britain on the seas: the virtually complete disarmament of the still largely intact German fleet interned at Scapa Flow (and be there to sign the contract largely self-recessed) and the acquisition of the German colonial empire belonged to the British demands . The reparation demands from Downing Street were very moderate, but growing rapidly due to internal political pressure because of the war partly caused, partly German-produced hate. The British feared, however, nothing more than a new war with Germany, which would create an unjust peace. The significantly pessimistic Clemenceau saw the war as desired certainty and only then, France as well as possible to prepare for it.
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| George, Orlando, Clemenceau and Wilson (left) at Versailles |
was already the Franco-British contrast sharply enough, so was the position of the Americans finally with the Europeans incompatible. On 8 January 1918 was U.S. President Wilson presented his Peace Programme of the 14 points that a peace on the basis of self-determination of peoples, and some vague points such as the freedom of the seas, the prohibition of secret diplomacy and provided for arms limitations. It had been these 14 points, set on the German political and military leaders had their hopes, when she asked for an armistice in November 1918. Meanwhile, almost a year had passed. In the winter of 1917-18 the German troops had not had a prospect of victory. In the autumn of 1918, that hope was gone. Wilson still believed it, enforce its vision to be able to. As a practical consequence of Germany's controversial Alsace-Lorraine would like Eupen-Malmedy and North Schleswig, and some parts of Silesia have to hand, as there were living abroad majorities. These points, however, prevented more fundamental requirements such as the division of the Empire or loss of territory around the Saarland and Rhineland, as requested by the French.
The negotiations on the treaty were mainly conducted between these three powers. Were not explicitly involved, the Germans were not implicated as already mentioned, the Russians and only peripherally involved, the other belligerent powers. This is especially important for Italy and Japan, which had both expected more from their participation in the war and felt at a disadvantage - a feeling that they in the postwar period to the right and then drove into an alliance with Nazi Germany. Clemenceau was able to prevail extensively. He failed, however, provided with its ultimatums, and his hard line on territorial concessions and reparations that his negotiating partner for this hard on other issues remained - this led to the strange combination of provisions that vervorbrachte the contract finally
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| Europe 1914 (left) and 1924 (right) |
Germany lost about 13% of its territory (the previously mentioned areas that fell under the self-determination of peoples and parts of West Prussia and Silesia) and which ultimately weighed worse, even 10% its indigenous population. Several million German lived suddenly after the decisions of the contract abroad, mainly in Czechoslovakia (Sudetenland) and Poland (West Prussia and Silesia), where they were from the newly assigned national governments are often disadvantaged and discriminated against. The German merchant fleet was reduced by 90%, the German army was reduced to 100,000, the navy to 10,000 men. An air force was completely banned, tanks and submarines and battleships anyway. The German military was thus shrunk to the level of Portugal, without opposite, that was the equivalent loss of economic power and population. Also were not the other countries prepared to the same extent or to disarm only ever experienced significantly, as was provided for the 14 points actually, so that this state could hardly be sustained.
Many of the cessions of territory have been legitimized by the means of the referendum, about Eupen -Malmedy (subsequently) or Silesia and Northern Schleswig (before). In particular, the referendum of Eupen and Malmedy and Silesia enraged the Germans because they were manipulated in the Belgian case well (though not to the accused by the German side scale) spawned and in Silesia impractical result , the subsequent division along arbitrarily drawn limits necessitated. With the lofty ideals Wilson all had little to do. The Americans retreated as far back in the course of the negotiations constantly receding, and the Senate said before signing, not to ratify the treaty. Of the three powers that had it worked out mainly fell a so effectively When it signed off. This affected even worse than that of the Versailles Treaty and the birth of Wilson's dream project, the League of Nations was. This forerunner of the United Nations suffered from the beginning to the lack of participation of the United States, Germany and the Soviet Union -. Therefore, three of the most powerful nations of the world
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| The first two pages of the Treaty |
When the treaty in the early summer of 1919 finally completed the German delegation was presented, this was stunned. The contract was much harder than expected and above all ready, and the German delegation, was the conviction was to be able to negotiate the contract. Instead, they had only a few days for written comments and then had to decide also in day time limit for or against the signing. We feel the end of World War I often forget that this constituted a serious breach of style: the usual practice the diplomacy of that time was that the vanquished as an equal partner in the peace negotiations at the table was sitting. The contrast with the Congress of Vienna in 1814/15, could take in the Talleyrand of France, representing significant influence could hardly be greater. However, in addition to Articles 231 weighed heavily on the delegation explain "The Allied and Associated Governments and Germany accepts that Germany and its allies are responsible for causing all the loss and damage which the Allied and Associated Governments and their nationals as a result of the war that was imposed on them by the aggression of Germany and its allies, suffered. " have is the case of Article 231 it is the infamous war guilt article. That was a novelty in the diplomatic world of that day, and never had a peace treaty efforts, the construct of "guilt". It has always been gone just about who won and who lost. Now, the Germans suddenly saw a moral component of the Treaty over.
alone, the war guilt article is probably one of the largest and most serious misunderstandings present in the story. The popular belief, he was taken into French to be operating - but the French were the most implacable Germany's opponents - are deceptive. Clemenceau was this use is entirely man of the 19th Century, which knew nothing to do with such categories. It was, ironically, just the Americans have been, who started this article. The Allies had given him no importance for them it was merely a legal construct that served to legitimate the contract because, given the 14 points a simple "We now have won," was no longer sufficient. He was merely an additional safeguard. If he had the Allies really had the meaning which it attributed to the German public, he would have placed certain prominent and far-reaching executed been. For the German delegation, whose members were close to a nervous breakdown, was the Treaty of the worst-case scenario. In the military we had already made plans on how Germany would be in case of non-signing to defend and Philipp Scheidemann resigned as chancellor with the famous words that would wither the hand that signed this treaty. It is a bitter irony of history that he ultimately kept quite.
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| demonstration against the Versailles Treaty, 1932 |
Despite this public outcry in Germany and numerous spontaneous rejection of statements which the participants themselves were quite aware that the recovery would mean the war, mean, despite the clear knowledge that mortgage, the contract for the young republic would, he, the delegation signed just days later after a re-insurance in Parliament that even the right parties would take such a decision (a promise that this course soon forgot again). This decision had several causes. The army was in the early summer of 1919 already in full resolution. Too much of it was demobilized, and some had fought in the Revolution, parts were still in the Baltic region under Allied High Command in the fight against the Bolsheviks. Compared to big-mouthed promises of the military, which could make the troops, they had developed since October 1918, a healthy caution. The revolution itself was survived by no means, and the prospect of a new wave that would perhaps provide more support for the left, pleases no one really - too much had been before the fate of the Duma in November 1917 eyes, precisely on this problem Lenin had fallen. Most recently he was not at all predictable what would happen if the contract would not be signed and the Allies took up the war. The French demands for a Dismantling of the Empire, which was awarded the contract at least as a unit - even though the Polish corridor, this unit is already destabilized - were far from the world. And last but not least were the British (international law) the blockade of Germany after the armistice still continues to maintain, so there was the food supply critical.
The progress of events is known: Germany signed and remained relatively quiet. In 1920, resisted to the Kapp Putsch, in which the military could operate already at the success of the stab against the Republic. In 1923, the kingdom of the operation of a partial reparation, after which France the Ruhr occupation and the military weakness of Germany lay open tender. The number of reparations had been fixed at all in the contract and was open at the top, first through several negotiations during the 1920s the number was set at quite a high sum, in installments through 1988 abbezahlbar was (!). Germany was the inclusion in the League as well as the desired refused by the people of both countries following German-Austria, which had to change under pressure from the Allies, even his name to Austria. The Pariah did thereupon, together with the other Pariah: the Soviet Union. Secretly upgraded to the Army, and in the right circles, it hardly at thought something other than a rematch.
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| Gustav Stresemann 1925 |
It was Foreign Minister Gustav Stresemann in the "Golden Era" of the Weimar Republic from 1924 to 1928 / to achieve 29 significant concessions in terms of the Versailles Treaty. His policy consisted of a reconciliation with the West, particularly France, and a revision of the Treaty in the East. To this end, ran the kingdom later defamed "policy of fulfillment" by the reparations at all clear once wrote, and then they tried to fulfill. 1926 reached Germany and the inclusion in the League and returned to the circle of "civilized nations" back. Compared to the east, especially Poland and Czechoslovakia, the goal remained clear for a revision of territorial losses. This policy was quite rational, lived in those areas but to a great extent, even in a majority in the Sudetenland, German, their explicit desire to "return to the kingdom" to the postulated self-determination of peoples was diametrically opposite. Instead of the Treaty aggressive tackle, Stresemann was therefore always a moral component - a barrel that had opened the contract with its war guilt article in the first place. The West was the spirits that he called had not let go.
However, the increasingly difficult legitimacy of discrimination in Germany was not the only issue that had the contract. During the 1920s, was among many state leaders are more realistic view of the broad agreement. The French and the British realized that he offered them much less secure than they had originally hoped, and the Germans - especially Stresemann - realized that he actually represented a chance for Germany. Indeed, the implications of self-determination of peoples were not considered enough 1919th In the 1920s, becoming increasingly clear that the Germans would not be there forever can hold, the Wilson is relevant to International Relations introduced moral element thanks. If the principle but would apply only once to Germany, would certainly Austria and the Sudetenland, and probably parts of Silesia and West Prussia to the Empire back again. The Polish Corridor would be securely closed - and thus access of Poland to the Baltic Sea, a vital requirement of the contractors. Stresemann was farsighted enough to see that. The armor restrictions are covered in the long run, and the reparations were anyway already completely dismembered - her graduation in four decades was completely unrealistic, and that was all Involved is clear. In fact, Germany has already paid in 1930 and had nothing at all the demands of the Allies never previously met in full.
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| occupation of the Ruhr in 1923 |
The contract was suffering but also without described the moral ballast of a fundamental misconception of power politics: after the U.S. withdrawal from Europe and the isolationism and the exclusion of Russia from the negotiations were only two powers that guaranteed the contract at all: England and France. And these were just the two powers, in the First World War had not been able to defeat Germany, a Germany that was also in the east against Russia must fight with it since the Treaty of Versailles not even had a common border. During the 1920s both had powers to recognize that in the event of a case would not be able to force Germany to compliance with the Treaty. Both countries went different conclusions from this finding.
England tried to come to an amicable agreement with Germany, and better integrate into the international diplomatic system such as the Kellogg-Briand Pact (the war as a means of Politics outlawed), but tried simultaneously to obtain the disarmament restrictions, especially in the field of naval armaments. Ultimately, it was a continuation of the balance-of-power politics, but was still missing basic building blocks: so both Austria-Hungary and Russia were missing in the traditional Mächtequintettt, and the U.S. were not a replacement available. In the 1930s Britain attempted therefore to achieve a rapprochement with Stalin's Soviet Union, but this was ultimately unsuccessful. On the understanding to prevent a military build-up of Germany can not chose the UK from 1934/35 to appeasement (appeasement) policies, in order to provide no reason for war. The Kriegsgebinn was thus postponed for one year. - Probably exactly the kind of year that allowed Britain to survive 1940/41
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| badge of the occupying forces of the Maginot Line |
France, however, resigned. The British withdrawal from the contract allowed it remained the only major power that seriously tried to enforce it - an untenable position. The French government therefore tried to drive with a dual strategy, the potential costs of a new war with Germany in the air. It concluded Alliances and mutual assistance pact with the unloved children of the Versailles Treaty, the Eastern European States. Because of Poland's slide into dictatorship Pidulskis remained the most reliable pillars of this policy, the continued democratic Czechoslovakia. Exactly these pillars but the British were gone in the Munich Agreement of 1938, when Hitler abandoned the Sudetenland - and thereby also the Fortifications and ultimately the sovereignty of Czechoslovakia. The second part of this strategy was, as a lesson from the hospital on the Western Front during the First World War (see here), the expansion of a massive border fortification (Maginot Line) along the border with Italy, Germany, Luxembourg and parts of Belgium. A German attempt should be nipped in the bud. The fortifications, extremely expensive, were on the cutting edge of technology. The claim was that the enemy should not even happen ("On ne passe pas") and his movement so that the war failed, remained inferior to the people of France to the Germans. The Maginot Line proved to be huge bad investment: not only were the German troops they deal with the unexpected thrust through the Ardennes, they manifested the resigned attitude of the French Government and its military in concrete, and disintegrated the morale of the population sustainable, largely due for a quick victory of the Wehrmacht in the West campaign contributed.
The Treaty of Versailles had not demonstrated its operational approach to peacebuilding. His main omissions were either the integration or long-term weakening of Germany - he made neither the one nor the other, but did the prevention of the one and the attempt of the other, which he had just serve to antagonize the Germans sustained peace. It would have been possible, however, to form still existing on the basis of his peace policy, had he had effective guarantor powers. The exclusion of Soviet Russia and the U.S. withdrawal, however, took exactly the guarantor powers from the game and let only by the cost of the war already heavily burdened British and the French left, against a determined Germany had no chance alone and also for each fled in different strategies, both of which proved to be ineffective. The question remains: what could have been done differently
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| Henry Morgenthau |
The first scenario is the French High solution? a break-up and sustainable weakening of Germany. As a result of contract negotiations this event is not conceivable, because the resistance of the British and Americans on the other hand proved to be too long term. In the case of a lost war resumed, and possibly it would be possible now. In this case we would have something to do with an early version of the Morgenthau Plan, a harsh victory of peace in which dissolved the Empire in full and, similarly, 1945, at the mercy of the winner will be - but without a system conflict among the winners of the German would receive. The splitting in several German states, the political affiliation of a potential state Rhineland to France and the widespread de-industrialization and disarmament would be immediate Consequences have been. The question, however, whether the Germans were ready for a united resistance found and these were actually enforced, the question is to the viability of such a peace, then, must remain pure speculation.
The second scenario in a sustainable integration Germany into a European federation. The plans for such a federation existed and lived during the 1920s in the context of pan-European movement, but also a revival. The output of the "khaki election" in Britain in 1918 (an obvious choice for an indulgent line against Germany) and the widespread hatred of Germans in France to make such an option if not impossible yet to implement politically difficult at best. In all probability, it would have this option, the political resistance had been overcome in every country, taken a positive course: Germany's admission into the League would have been possible much earlier, a consensus, negotiation-based solution of the reparations had been found. The incentive for such a solution, however, was in contrast to 1946/47 due to the lack of system conflict with the Soviet Union not given.
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| French mountain troops in Buer, 1923 |
The third scenario is the refusal of a signature by the German delegation. The reasons that they were persuaded to release the signature shown previously, but there is reason to believe that the consequences are not so drastically become: the demobilization of the Allied forces was the summer of 1919 at least so far advanced as that of the German and the public after all these democratic states had already been set for peace and stood for a resumption of war against not enthusiastic. The alternative Santander allies at a non-signature The Germans were down to two: renegotiation, this time with Germany, or invasion and occupation. In the former case, the kingdom would knock out the young democracy and better conditions, at least, something better can post to the right. In the second case, the Allies would occupy the country and even to arrange - with unforeseeable consequences. Although dangerous, the risk might well have to bear fruit.
course, all that, decades later, can say lightly. His contemporaries were under heavy pressure and were of decades of nationalist saber-rattling as well as impressed, especially the impact of four years, destructive, costly war determined. They had maneuvered itself into a political dead end from which it was easy no escape. Without the collapse of the global economic crisis would be the complete revision of the Treaty, which was effectively achieved in 1932, probably not a democratic government and Hitler benefited, and the contract would still have been history. Either way, he served the Allies in World War II as a blueprint of what could not be done.
References:
Volker Ullrich - The German Revolution 1918/19
Eduard Bernstein - The German Revolution 1918/19
Alexander Gallus - the forgotten revolution 1918/19
Eduard Bernstein - The German Revolution 1918/19
Alexander Gallus - the forgotten revolution 1918/19
Photo credits:
Versailles - William Orpen (public domain)
Clemenceau - Bain News Service (public domain)
Big Four - Cpt. Jackson, U.S. Signal Corps (public domain)
Map of Europe - Carnegie Endowment for Peace 1924 (public domain)
Treaty - The Library of Congress (Public Domain)
Demo - Unknown (CC-BY-SA 3.0)
Gustav Stresemann - Unknown (CC-BY-SA 3.0)
Ruhr fight - Unknown (CC-BY-SA 3.0)
Badge - Motte mountain (public domain)
Morgenthau - David Silvette (public domain)
Mountain - Unknown (CC-BY-SA 3.0)
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