By Stefan Sasse
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| Willy Brandt to the Bundestag in 1971 |
1969, the SPD emerged from the elections after the Grand Coalition, while not as the strongest party, but they had together with the FDP, a narrow majority of 12 seats. The former SPD Chairman Brandt decided against the massive occurrence of Wehner and Schmidt for a social liberal coalition. This coalition came with two key promise: the promise of a took a policy of internal reforms ("We want to dare more democracy", Brandt), the other said, change the deadlocked politics with the Soviet bloc ("change through rapprochement). Both parts of the program met with strong opposition of the CDU / CSU, which felt after 20 years in power to their "birthright" cheated and treated rebels who had come illegally to power "the coalition and (Günter Gaus). The guided-holds-barred fighting especially around the Ostpolitik led to the since change of several SPD and FDP MPs on the benches of the Union, so that the already melted together small majority-resistant. In the spring of 1972 then a stalemate was reached with a tie, the chairman of the CDU used for the first constructive vote of no confidence the Federal Republic's history. Although he did have a majority of one vote, in the end he lacked two votes from his own camp - thanks SED-corruption, as we now know, the bribes were flying low in those years. The SPD then planned the first-time resolution of the Bundestag of a lost confidence vote and the proclamation of new elections in November 1972.
The election campaign, the entbrandte the summer of 1972, is unique in the history of the FRG. The debate was intense and hard and never reached a previously unknown politicization and Polarization of the people. It was practically impossible to face the election with indifference. The turnout reached 91.1% with an undefeated record level today, and the SPD was 45.8% for the first time until 1998, the strongest party and achieved their best result in more than 100 years of party history. But what drew in the election campaign, why polarized it so much that many leading media of those days is concerned about never-healing fractures and trenches provided and the young Union seriously debated the declaration of the Revolution for the case of Brandt's election victory? the campaign was really like Arnulf Bahring in his standard work " change of power, "explains has mainly a referendum on the Ostpolitik, in which domestic politics played a relatively minor role? The following is intended to show how the SPD As for the election, what issues were on the agenda and why she won. It will also answer the question how and why the huge polarization was so far no more as the campaign has been conducted 1972nd
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| Willy Brandt and Willi Stoph in Erfurt 1970 |
The first point is the drama of the election. The SPD strategists saw it as crucial, both to the memory of the constructive Confidence vote in the spring as to the successes of the previous Eastern policy to revive that were modified by the particularly Schiller affair (see later) forgotten. The memory of the constructive no-confidence vote sparked Brandt personally by the planned escalation of a political scandal by the Spiegel interview the defectors corruption imputed. For days, was the dispute over this charge and for a reminder to the vote of no confidence on the front lines of the newspapers. The Ostpolitik of the other, was reinforced through a strategic delay of the completion of the Basic Treaty with East Germany into consciousness. The agreement was initialed only two weeks before the election (Namely with signatures), but not ratified (ie, legally valid). The ratification was postponed to after the election - was targeted in this way gives the impression of a decision in the choice and the eastern policy. In the actual election, however, the Ostpolitik was addressed by both sides but little more - the debate on this subject took place mainly in the media where they are also deeply divided media landscape disputed sovereignty of interpretation.
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| Rainer Barzel in the election campaign in 1972 |
The second point was the culmination on the actors, a dramatic cut to the party chairman. On this side of the SPD Willy Brandt as chancellor was, on the part of the CDU party, these were the chairperson of the CDU and CSU Rainer Barzel and Franz Josef Strauss. The SPD was the first time, heartily in a West German election campaign the chancellor advantage on their side and used it and the related privileges from. Since Brandt was the top candidate of the SPD for over 10 years, were associated with him personal scandals (his drinking, his womanizing and his exile during the Second World War) is sufficiently known so that the return to CDU experiments, it negatively themed, hardly had success. Conversely, Franz Josef Strauss and particularly dismantled Rainer Barzel as the political people. Franz Josef Strauss was supported by the SPD as the most powerful man shown in the background, Rainer Barzel - whose name the SPD like pejoratively called with his unusual middle name, "Rainer Barzel Candidus" - fully controlled. This strategy was so successful that the CDU did not know what else to do than Barzel in a "team" to frame to provide the expertise to Brandt's personal approval ratings should - a strategy that has not worked before or since 1972 or ever. It is remarkable to be associated with the dismantling Barzel especially the mirror, the buckets of dirt on the CDU candidate distributes and ran a real campaign against him, against that of Lafontaine in recent years was in no way inferior.
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| Karl Schiller 1969 |
The third point is the Defense of the CDU's main program point, stability. Inflation reached in 1972 an annual average of 6.5%, and the Union was easy to exploit the natural fear of the Germans against high inflation and establishing itself as the guarantor of stability and a strong DM. In fact, stability was the dominant domestic political issue for much of 1972. SPD economics minister Karl Schiller, the crucial 4% electoral votes for the election victory in 1969 was awarded ("Schiller-voters") and who was said to be the key to the SPD in access to middle class, had gone since the spring on a collision course with the government and said called for a policy of stability and against employment and growth policies. He played into the hands of the CDU, and his resignation as a minister and his party were leaving in the summer only logical. The contemporary commentators saw the CDU victory with the stability issue and Schiller saved as Kronzeuige. It has not yet succeeded every time to capitalize on the political stability of the CDU; 1972 succeeded in this, though. This was because the SPD, the subject is not passive conception, but aggressively went on the offensive. Like a mantra she had the new Economy Minister Schmidt, who pushed for it in public statements to the right even more than before, and so proclaim the gap left by Schiller's play concluded that the CDU would cure inflation with more unemployment. The charges did not damage the CDU but in their own electorate, but the supporters of the SPD and FDP were within his own camp, as it gave them a separate argument against the CDU slogans and were helpful in the so-called undecided on the social liberal side to . draw
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| Rut Brandt, Willy Brandt, Günter Grass (fl, summer festival 1970) |
The fourth point was the so-called voter initiatives. The year 1972 saw a flood of private initiatives, which intervened in the election campaign and attended for one or the other side with their own ads, posters and events position. For the SPD were mainly two groups significantly: the Social Democratic voter initiative SWI and the unions. The SWI was a group of intellectuals in Günter Grass, Heinrich Böll and Siegfried Lenz. She mobilized large Part of the intellectual milieu since 1961 and was crucial for breaking into this previously closed the SPD voters. The unions said, however, decided after some considerations in favor of the SPD, which had previously committed to an employee-centered campaigns (see next point). For the CDU spoke out all the employers associations, which also threw a lot of money in the scales, producing a veritable flood of anonymous reports, in which the SPD was heavily attacked. The SPD trod the unusual step of this kind of campaign finance attack public ("battle against Big Money") and thus had a great success. This was certainly the aggressiveness and extent of the ads due to many people angry rather than revenue for the CDU / CSU. Although the government the SPD thus represented as the Angegiffene Small, which is usually the prerogative of the opposition. The CDU had also tried this by presenting the nominal supremacy of the SPD in the campaign finance, but in reality the money ratio was about 3:1 against the SPD
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| . Helmut Schmidt in 1975 |
Another serious problem of the SPD on this field was the open left flank. The SDS, the SHB and the Young Socialists were in the wake of the '68 riots clearly positioned on the left, and although they are separated by the SDS and withdrawals had been made by the SHB, the Young Socialists remained in a distinct SPD-binding and were the outside left-wing. For the CDU, it was so easy, to drive in Germany traditionally successful track socialism fear and the SPD if not revolutionary tendencies to imply then at least one foreign control by the Young Socialists - something of a revolution of the external control allegation, which the SPD against Barzel and Strauss could affix. In this field, the SPD chose the unusual step of a direct Attack. She made a different concept of socialism as its own ("democratic socialism") and filled it with positive content. The Young Socialists, actually rebellious and difficult to control, were involved through open discussions in the party's work and were given effect. Thus, the SPD largely mitigate the problems and keep their own people at bar. Outwardly stressed the SPD also like their independence and control of the Young Socialists, which emphasizes striking about the participation of the right provided Helmut Schmidt succeeded in panel events.
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| Brandt in the election campaign (1980) |
The fifth point relates to the SPD program as entscheindes link the campaign. The aforementioned factors were used to good parts of the defense against attacks by the CDU and the weaknesses of the SPD. The Socialists, however, went a step further. They designed a coherent program with several areas of focus, all the two key words' quality of life "and" reforms ". It was positive, almost exclusively domestic political models of society that revolved around improving the quality of life through environmental protection, more democracy, more labor rights, participation and the expansion of social services. This program enabled the voters of the SPD, is understood as a "community of values" (Albrecht Müller), which fought together for a specific design for the future. This is the supporters of the SPD also immunized against many Anwürde the CDU and against the problem that many of these reforms cost money and tax increases would make it necessary. The Ostpolitik played in this program only a minor role and was mainly marketed as a "peace policy". Overall, the program provided a strong profile of the SPD and contributed significantly to the politicization of the public in.
The last point concerns the actual organization of the campaign. The best Messages are useless if it is not possible to bring it to the addressee. The SPD went here a multi-pronged strategy. The first point relates to the ads in traditional print media. There were ads that aggressively addresses the strategy of the CDU presented (such as the stability or the "big money") and counter-facts. There were also ads that presented in serious style information from SPD-view and those with ironic humor and attacked the enemy and their own weaknesses and themed weakened. In this way, many recipients have been reached. As extremely important to put the mobilization of the SPD itself out. The campaigners put considerable resources into information and coordination of the members who helped volunteer and then at least balance out something that financial superiority of the Union. The information services of the SPD were there incredibly quickly, sometimes their information came quickly to the public than the traditional media!
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| election results of the SPD |
It was also to great efforts in mobilizing young voters, who benefited first from the lowering of the voting age to 18 years. The SPD managed to collect very many of those voices that really more of a protest arose - just four years after 1968 a huge success. She was also at least largely to fend off the suffocating embrace of their small coalition partner FDP and prevent the attempts of vote splitting a large extent and to prevent at least to parts of a migration of "rational voters" (FDP-election slogan) to the party. The SPD might benefit from the battle of the media with each other and engage in it. The Springer and Bauer-press was the Social Democracy set extremely hostile; papers like the mirror or the Frankfurter Rundschau taken against strong party for the SPD. The campaigners limited contacts with "hostile" press to a minimum so as to credibility . Not to increase further
be stated summary must show that the SPD's strategy in 1972 fully came up: the Social Democrats provided specifically for high politicization and polarization, and used this by itself a clear, employee-centered reformist Profile gave. The CDU could not come up in comparison by far with such a clear profile and do not mobilize the undecided to the same extent as the SPD. The SPD was in this very open process, not only for program discussions within the party, but also from the outside such as the SWI. This development alarmed many SPD leaders, especially Herbert Wehner, Helmut Schmidt, the returns were astonished this element significantly in the future. From the programmatic capital of the election in 1972, the SPD, however, lived for several years into the era Schmidt, whose decidedly pragmatic program but could not develop any similar binding power and the 1980 could only be victorious as the anti-Strauss. Brandt won himself from his biggest victory is little joy: he was diagnosed with difficulty on election night and had the following key coalition negotiations Wehner and Schmidt left, the counter checked his efforts from some Brandt-combatants as Ehmke and Ahlers and the traditional wing of the FDP confer much space. Also, because Ölschoks of 1973 and that political obstacles could not redeem the SPD many promises of reform. Schmidt, who they had already always averse to pushing, the ruling Social Democrats then in a different direction than that of the party. But that's another story.
References:
Photo credits:
Brandt 1971 - Ludwig Wegmann (CC-BY-SA 3.0)
Brandt , Stoph - Unknown (CC-BY-SA 3.0)
Barzel-Engelbert Reineke (CC-BY-SA 3.0)
Karl Schiller - Ludwig Wegmann (CC-BY-SA 3.0 )
Summer Festival - Jens Gathercole (CC-BY-SA 3.0)
Schmidt - Dieter Demme (CC-BY-SA 3.0)
Brandt 1980 - Promifotos.de (public domain)
Results - fracture friend (public domain)
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